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THE NEW GENERAL CODE FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
SUPREME COURT RULES INTERPRETED'
CARL C. WIIEATON*
OBJECTIVES OF CODE
The purpose and spirit of both the code and of the court rules requires
a liberal construction of precedural provisions. The code itself requires its
provisions to be "construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.1'2
COVERAGE
The Civil Code, while not supplanting special procedure statutes, such




A party to an action is a person whose name is designated on the record
as a plaintiff or defendant.4
b. When One Is Party
Persons named as defendants are parties until the court makes disposi-
tion as to them, whether or not they have been served with process.5
c. Real Party in Inuterest
In a declaratory judgment proceeding involving the validity of a muni-
cipal franchise, the city whose franchise is involved is, under Section 527.110
of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, a real party in interest.6
Since possession of property gives one a sufficient interest therein to
sue in trespass vi et armis, one in possession at the time of an alleged tres-
pass is a real party in interest and may bring such an action.7
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri, A.B., 1911, Leland Stanford Junior
University, LL.B., 1915, Harvard University. Draftsman for the Missouri Supreme
Court Committee on Civil Practice and Procedure.
1. The interpretations are based primarily on Volume 240 through 248 of
the Southwestern Reporter, second series. The statutory coverage is confined to
those statutes in the Mo. REv. STAT. (1949) which replace the General Code for
Civil Procedure found in the Laws of Missouri, 1943.
2. Edmondson v. Edmondson, 242 S.W. 2d 730 (Mo. App. 1951).
3. Green v. Green, 240 S.W. 2d 741 (Mo. App. 1951).
4. Downey v. United Weatherproofing, 241 S.W. 2d 1007 (Mo. 1951).
5. Ibid.
6. Board of Public Works of Rolla v. Sho-Me Power Corp., 244 S.W. 2d
S5 (Mo. 1951).
7. Robertson v. Welch, 246 S.W. 2d 828 (Mo. App. 1952).
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d. Wrong Party Sues
Where the Board of Public Works of Rolla was incorrectly made the
plaintiff in an action to have a city contract declared void, on appeal the
supreme court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff on condition that
the city within fifteen days adopt the acts of its Board of Public Works
in connection with the case and ask to be substituted as the plaintiff in the
action.8
e. Action by State
An action can only be brought in the name of the state when this is
provided for by statute.9
f. Indispensable Parties
In an action to cancel a trustee's deed given to a purchaser in connection
with a foreclosure sale, it was held that the trustee would be a proper party,
but that he was not an indispensable party, since he had no interest in the
subject matter of the suit.1o
g. Class Suits
Members of a local church congregation may, in their own names and
in behalf of other members of the congregation, bring an action against the
parent church and others who claim to act as trustees for the local church,
to enjoin the defendants from interfering with the holding of religious serv-
ices in the church building used by the local church and from selling and dis-
posing of realty used by the local church organization, and such action should
not be brought in the name of the state or in the name of the local church.""
h. Interpleader
In an interpleader suit, each claimant of property involved is in effect
a plaintiff, who must recover on the strength of his own title, not on the
weakness of his adversary's claim of title.12
i. Third-Party Practice
Where A sued B and C, it was held that B could, in a single pleading,
sue C as a cross-claim defendant and others as third-party defendants."8 It
should be noticed that no question of misjoinder was raised in the trial court.
8. Board of Public Works of Rolla v. Sho-Me Power Corp., supra note 6.
9. State ex rel. and to use of Northside Church of God v. Church of God,
247 S.W. 2d 542 (Mo. App. 1952).
10. Casper v. Lee, 245 S.W. 2d 132 (Mo. 1952).
11. State ex rel. and to Use of Northside Church of God v. Church of God,
supra note 9.
12. Star-Times Publishing Co. v. Buder, 245 S.W. 2d 59 (Mo. 1952).
13. Elzea v. Hammack, 244 S.W. 2d 594 (Mo. App. 1951).
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Otherwise the holding seems incorrect, since the pleading of cross-claims and
claims against third-party defendants are treated differently under the Mis-
souri procedure statutes.
Under the third-party practice statute, it should appear that the third-
party petition, offered to be filed, tenders issues which would make the third-
party defendant liable either to the original plaintiff or to the original de-
fendant. And, if the plaintiff cannot have a judgment against the tendered
third-party defendant, it is imperative that the third-party petition tender
issues which would make the third-party defendant liable to the third-party
plaintiff. 14
When the original plaintiff declines to accept the tendered third-party
defendant as a defendant in the case, and declines to amend his petition to
state a cause of action against such tendered third-party defendant, no judg-
ment can be had in favor of the plaintiff against the tendered third-party
defendant. Where the plaintiff did not amend and state a cause of action
against the tendered third-party defendant, but had by contract covenanted
not to sue the third-party defendant, it was not material to the merits of the
controversy that the third-party petition filed by the defendant stated a
cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the third-party defendant,
for, under such circumstances, the plaintiff could in no event have a judg-
ment against the third-party defendant.15
Under the third-party practice statute, the third-party defendant is
bound by the adjudication of the third-party plaintiff's liability to the
plaintiff.-
j. Substitution of
The substitution of trustees in bankruptcy in place of a corporation
which was sued prior to the bankruptcy proceeding against it is not required
by Section 507.100(4) of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, relating to the
substitution of parties in cases in which there are corporate partiesY.1
PLEADINGS
a. Sufficiency of
A petition before a court must be one in the first instance which is
sufficient to initiate the exercise of the court's jurisdiction before any further
proceeding or relief is warranted thereon.1 8
14. State ex rel. and to Use of Merino v. Rose, 240 S.W. 2d 705 (Mo. 1951).
Compare Byrnes v. Scaggs, 247 S.W. 2d 826 (Mo. 1952).
15. Ibid.
16. Elzea v. Hammack, supra note 13.
17. Merrick v. Bridgeways, Inc., 241 S.W. 2d 1015 (Mo. 1951).
18. State ex rel. and to the Use of Merino v. Rose, supra note 14.
3
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In determining whether a petition states a claim, only the well-pleaded
facts of the petition are properly considered.19
A mere conclusion of a pleader is insufficient as part of a pleading. This
rule has been applied to an allegation that the negligence of a third-party
defendant was either the direct or the sole cause of a collision;20 to a state-
ment that "the said County Board of Education in the attempted call for
said special election for the purpose of forming said proposed Enlarged
School District... failed and neglected to comply with provisions of Section
8 of said Senate Bill No. 307... in the following particulars: ... That said
purported election of October 21, 1949 was not duly and regularly called by
the County Board of Education of DeKalb County, Missouri."; 21 and to
allegations of plaintiffs that they had complied with mandates set out in a
warranty deed without alleging what the mandates were.22
b. Afflrinative and Negative Defenses
1. Laches
Some cases applying the rules of pleading recognized in classical equity
hold that the pleader must excuse long delay in the assertion of a right by
averments of fact rebutting a "presumptive inequity," and that, in the
absence of such averments, a bill is inadequate. This doctrine, however, has
never been, or at least is not now, accepted in this state as a requirement of
proper pleading. Conceivably, a plaintiff might plead enough evidentiary
facts to show himself. guilty of laches; if so, the action would be properly
dismissed on motion. Otherwise, laches is a question of fact to be determined
by all of the circumstances. 23
2. Estoppel
Estoppel is an affirmative defense. 24
3. Sole Cause
A "sole cause" defense is not an affirmative defense but is one that can
be made under a general denial or under an answer specifically denying the
negligence charged in the petition. Hence where the defendants' answer
19. State ex rel. and to the Use of Northside Church of God v. Church of
God, supra note 9.
20. State ex rel. and to the Use of Merino v. Rose, supra note 14.
21. Spiking School Dist. No. 71, DeKalb County v. Purported "Enlarged
School Dist. R-11, DeKalb County, Missouri," 245 S.W. 2d 13 (Mo. 1952).
22. State ex rel. and to the Use of the Northside Church of God v. Church
of God, supra note 9.
23. In Re Thompson's Estate, 246 S.W. 2d 791 (Mo. 1952).
24. Howard National Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 243 S.W. 2d 305 (Mo. 1951).
4
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specifically denied all of the charges of negligence in the amended petition,
a "sole cause" plea in the answer was surplusage.2'
c. Counterclaims
The purpose of Section 509.420 of the Revised Statutes is to discourage
separate litigations covering the same subject matter and to require their
adjudication in the same action. It is also a means of bringing all logically
related claims into a single litigation through the penalty of precluding the
later assertion of omitted claims.
2 6
Where there was a collision between two automobiles and one of the
owners settled an action against him through his insurance company, he
could not later sue the owner of the other car for a claim arising out of the
collision, since his cause involved a compulsory counterclaim. The plaintiff
argued that the counterclaim was not compulsory, since the settlement of
the first action, which was in the hands of representatives of the insurance
company, was made by them before the time to answer the petition had
expired, and since the insurance company did not represent him as to his
counterclaim. These arguments, I believe, were properly rejected, as the
compulsory counterclaim section clearly makes no exception to actions
involving the facts of this case.2 7
d. Amendments to Pleadings
In a slander action, the plaintiff was permitted to amend his petition
by changing the date of the alleged slanderous statement from the time
originally alleged in the petition to another date.m 2'
In a negligence action the court was held properly to have permitted
the plaintiff to amend his petition by interlineation by adding an additional
assignment of negligence, since it did not appear that the defendant was
misled or prejudiced by the amendment or that the court abused its discre-
tion in permitting the amendment.29
Where the record showed that, on motion of the defendant, the plain-
tiff's original petition was dismissed with leave to plead further within 20
days, and that the plaintiff thereafter filed his amended petition, and where
it appeared that the plaintiff probably had had an opportunity to discover
all of the facts pertaining to his claim and that the specific reasons for the
25. Abernathy v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 240 S.W. 2d 914 (Mo. 1951);
Spicer v. Hannah, 247 S.W. 864 (Mo. App. 1952).
26. Keller v. Keklikian, 244 S.W. 2d 1001 (Mo. 1951).
27. Ibid.
28. Delcour v. Wilson, 245 S.W. 2d 467 (Mo. App. 1952).
29. Merrick v. Bridgeways, Inc., supra note 17.
5
Wheaton: Wheaton: New General Code
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1952
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
defendant's attack upon his original petition were made known to the
plaintiff prior to the court's first order of dismissal, it was held that, if there-
after the plaintiff did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
substantial justice would not be served by enabling the pleader to avail
himself of trial procedure.30
Where an action to recover death benefits under an industrial policy
was tried by both parties upon the apparent assumption that the sufficiency
of consideration for the release of all claims under the policy was a proper
issue, though the insufficiency of such consideration was not pleaded, the
pleadings were considered as amended to conform to the evidence.3 '
Where an attorney testified as to the date of the deposit of a deed,
permission to amend the petition by interlineation to conform to the proof
and to show delivery as of the date testified to, was held not to be error,
where the allowance of the amendment did not prejudice the defendants in
maintaining their defense on the merits. 2
A suit which is prematurely brought may not be maintained, even
though the cause of action has perchance accrued by the time the case is
called for trial; nor may an amended petition in such a case set up a cause
of action which had not accrued at the time the original petition was filed.
One can not effectively amend a petition which had no standing when it
was originally filed."3
e. Joinder of Different Bases for Claim
In an action by a switchman against a railroad under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act for injuries sustained when the switchman alighted
from a switch engine and was struck by a locomotive traveling on a parallel
track, the switchman could plead conjunctively that the railroad failed to
maintain a safe place to work, and that the switch engineer failed to keep a
lookout and to warn the switchman of the approaching locomotive.8 4
When a plaintiff has but a single cause of action which may be stated in
different ways so as to meet different phases of the evidence as the same
may possibly develop at the trial, he may state such cause of action in dif-
ferent counts, and cannot be compelled to elect upon which count or theory
he will proceed."5
30. Boyer v. Guidicy Marble, Terrazzo & Tile Co., 246 S.W. 2d 742 (Mo.
1952).
31. Scott v. Missouri Ins. Co., 246 S.W. 2d 349 (Mo. App. 1952).
32. Wilcox v. Coons, 241 S.W. 2d 907 (Mo. 1951).
33. Slater v. Missouri Edison Co., 245 S.W. 2d 457 (Mo. App. 1952).
34. Timmerman v. Terminal R.R Ass'n of St Louis, 241 S.W. 2d 477 (Mo.
1951).
35. Tabor v. Ford, 240 S.W. 2d 737 (Mo. App. 1951).
[Vol. 17
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f. Joinder of Causes
Under Sections 379.195 and 379.200 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri,
an action against an insurer can not be joined with one against the insured,
if the insurer objects to such joinder. It has a right not to be sued in con-
nection with the claim against the insured until judgment is obtained
against said insured.80
MOTIONS IN GENE AL
a. Replace Demurrers
Motions now take the place of the old demurrer which has been abol-
ished.37
b. Grounds for
The lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the person,
improper venue, insufficiency of process or the service thereof, lack of legal
incapacity to sue, pendency of another action between the same parties for
the same cause in this state, misjoinder of several claims, and the improper
interposition of a counter-claim or cross-claim have all been made grounds
for a motion to dismiss.38
This is also true of nonjoinder of parties.9
c. Speaking Motions
The grounds for any of the above stated objections may be supplied in
motions by an affidavit accompanying the motion and may be controverted
by affidavit. 40
However the new code retains the rule that the objection must appear
on the face of the pleadings when the petition is attacked for failure to state
a claim.41
d. Admission of Allegations
A motion to dismiss a petition for failure to state a cause of action
admits, for the purposes of the motion, the truth of all facts well pleaded
in the pleading attacked and any inferences fairly deducible therefrom.42
e. Waiver of Ground for Motion
Under the provisions of Section 509.340 of the Revised Statutes of Mis-
souri, a party waives all objections available to him by failure to assert the
36. State ex rel. Anderson v. Dinwiddie, 359 Mo. 980, 224 S.W. 2d 985 (1949).
37. State v. Shultz, 243 S.W. 2d 808 (Mo. App. 1951).
38. Ibid.
39. Casper v. Lee, supra note 10.
40. State v. Shultz, supra note 37.
41. Ibid.
42. Bedell v. Daugherty, 242 S.W. 2d 572 (Mo. 1951); Vandeventer v. Shields,
241 S.W. 2d 53 (Mo. App. 1951).
7
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same by timely motion, except failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, failure to state a legal defense to a claim, and lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.43
Under the provisions of our former code of pleading, it was uniformly
held that a defect of parties was waived by a failure to raise the point by
demurrer or answer. The provisions of the present law have not changed
this rule. The waiver of a defect in parties, if it exists, is no less effective
where a defendant fails to plead at all, than where a party, having pleaded,
fails to raise the point.4
f. Construction of Petition on Motion
Upon a motion to dismiss a petition for failure to state facts upon which
relief may be granted, the court construes the petition most favorably to the
plaintiff.45
g. Ground Given by Court for Dismissal
If a court properly dismisses a petition, it is immaterial on what ground
it acts or what ground it assigns for its decision."
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
A motion for a judgment on the pleadings raises only issues of law and
will lie only when the moving party, on the face of the pleadings, is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.47
Therefore, where the pleadings raised an issue of fact, the motion was
denied.48
During the year, it has also been decided that one making such a motion
admits only the facts pleaded by his adversary and not the latter's conclu-
sions of law.4 9
OFFER OF JUDGMENT
Where a buyer made an offer of judgment for the difference between the
amount paid and the price charged on one order, and the seller, who had
sufficient notice of the limitation on the authority of the buyer's agent but
who claimed the difference between the price originally fixed in another
order and the increased price to which the agent had unauthorizedly changed
43. Casper v. Lee, supra note 10.
44. Ibid.
45. Bedell v. Daugherty, supra note 42.
46. Spiking School District 71, DeKalb County v. Purported "Enlarged
School Dist. R-11, DeKalb County, Missouri," supra note 21.
47. Struckoff v. Thompson, 241 S.W. 2d 39 (Mo. App. 1951).
48. Struckhoff v. Thompson, supra note 47; Brand v. Brand, 243 S.W. 2d
981 (Mo. 1951).
49. Brand v. Brand, supra note 48.
8
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the order, rejected the offer, judment for the amount of the offer with costs
against the seller from the date of the offer was proper.5°
MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICTS
Demurrers to the evidence have been replaced by motions for directed
verdicts.1
Though, in a jury case, the defendant mistakenly moved to dismiss
instead of making a motion for a directed verdict, since Section 510.280 of
the Revised Statutes of Missouri authorizes a dismissal even if a motion for
a directed verdict is made, an appeal from an involuntary dismissal was per-
mitted.12 This is a reasonable result, since form should not prevail over sub-
stance.
The general rule is that, if a party has adduced in support of his case
evidence which is substantial, when coupled with inferences that may be
legitimately drawn therefrom, the case is for the jury and a motion for a
directed verdict should be overruled. In other words, the court will not
weigh the evidence. 3
Therefore, a verdict may be directed for a defendant only when the
facts in evidence and the legitimate inferences drawn therefrom are so
strongly against a plaintiff as to leave no room for reasonable minds to
differ.54
If a trial court properly directs a verdict for a defendant, it is immaterial
that the court may have assigned an erroneous or insufficient reason
therefor. 5
In a negligence action, a motion for a directed verdict under the new
code challenges, as did the former demurrer to the evidence, all of the assign-
ments of negligence covered by the pleadings. If the motion is overruled and
the plaintiff thereupon submits only part of such assignments, he does so
with knowledge that such assignment or assignments so submitted have
been challenged, and the court is deemed to have known, when it permitted
such submission, whether it regarded the issue or issues submitted had been
50. Werner v. Welsh Co., 247 S.W. 2d 311 (Mo. App. 1952).
51. Girratono v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 243 S.W. 2d 539 (Mo. App.
1951).
52. Merit Specialities Co. v. Gilbert Brass Foundry Co., 241 S.W. 2d 718(Mo. 1951).
53. Hillhouse v. Thompson, 243 S.W. 2d 531 (Mo. 1951); Girratono v. Kansas
City Public Service Co., supra note 51.
54. Altenderfer v. Harkins, 243 S.W. 2d 558 (Mo. App. 1951); Cline v. City of
St. Joseph, 245 S.W. 2d 695 (Mo. App. 1952).
55. Powers v. Shore, 248 S.W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1952).
9
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supported by sufficient evidence. Thereafter, when the defendant renews his
objections by his after-trial motion to set aside the judgment and for judg-
ment in his favor (as in the case of the old demurrer to the evidence when
the objections were renewed by motion for a new trial), the objections are
deemed to be directed to and leveled at only the issues of negligence sub-
mitted. and all assignments not submitted to the jury are, as formerly, for
the time being, considered waived and discarded by the plaintiff. The appel-
late court is not bound to search the record for other assignments which the
evidence may have made submissible.r 6
INSTRUCTIONS
In civil actions there must be a request for an instruction to place on
the court a duty of giving such instruction.57
A complaint that a court erred in orally instructing the jury to disregard
an argument was held to be without merit. Section 510.300 of the Revised
Statutes of Missouri, which requires that instructions shall be in writing, is
applicable only to instructions which submit to the jury the issues being
tried.',
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
The effect of Sections 510.280 and 510.290 of the Revised Statutes of
Missouri is that, upon the overruling of a motion for a directed verdict at
the close of all the evidence, the authority of the court to determine the
legal questions thereby presented, and to set the judgment aside, without
ordering a new trial, is not exhausted by its refusal of the motion. If
the motion for a directed verdict is refused, the court is deemed to have
submitted the cause to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal
questions so raised, if again presented, after verdict and judgment, by the
defendant on a motion to set aside the verdict and judgment and to enter
judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict. In such
event, the court may then again consider and pass on the legal questions
theretofore raised upon the whole record. The words "in accordance with
his motion for directed verdict" are a reference to the summary method of
disposing of the case without retrial, and do not mean that the court must
56. Girratono v. Kansas City Public Service Co., supia note 51.
57. Whaley v. Milton Construction & Supply Co., 241 S.W. 2d 23 (Mo. App.
1951).
58. O'Donnelly v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 246 S.W. 2d 539 (Mo. App.
1952); Reliable Life Ins. Co. v. Bell, 246 S.W. 2d 371 (Mo. 1952).
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1952], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol17/iss4/2
19523 WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1951 447
consider the record only as it stood at the close of all the evidence. The
primary purpose of this motion is to obtain the correct judgment without
the expense and delay of a new trial.59
.If a trial court rules correctly on this type of after-trial motion, it is
immaterial that it may have assigned an erroneous or insufficient reason for
its ruling.00
CASES TRIED WITHOUT A JURY
a. Findings of the Court
Under Section 510.310(2) of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, it is the
duty of the trial court on request of either party to dictate or prepare and file
a brief opinion containing a statement of the grounds for its decision.61
b. Fact Issues
In a case tried without a jury, fact issues on which no findings are made
are deemed found in accordance with the result reached.
2
c. Motion to Amend Judgment
A motion to amend the judgment in a case tried by a court extends the
time to appeal to the same extent that a motion for a new trial defers it.63
d. Duties of Appellate Courts
It is the duty of an appellate court to hear de novo a case tried without
a jury. It should reach its own opinion on the facts where the evidence is
conflicting. It should, however, give great deference to the decision of the
trial judge on the facts, since he had the superior advantage of hearing and
observing the witnesses as they testified. 64
This rule has been applied to equity cases,65 to actions at law,66 to an ac-
59. Girratono v. Kansas City Public Service, supra note 51.
60. Brown v. Moore, 248 S.W. 2d 553 (Mo. 1952).
61. Prugh, Combest & Land, Inc. v. Linwood State Bank, 241 S.W. 2d 83
(Mo. App. 1951).
62. Maas v. Dreckshage, 244 S.W. 2d 397 (Mo. App. 1951).
63. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 243 S.W. 2d 804 (Mo. App. 1951).
64. Bank of Kennett v. Clayton, 245 S.W. 2d 678 (Mo. App. 1952).
65. Bohnsack v. Hanebrink, 240 S.W. 2d 903 (Mo. 1951); Milanko v. Austin,
241 S.W. 2d 881 (Mo. 1951); State ex rel. Taylor v. Anderson, 242 S.W. 2d 66
(Mo. 1951); Feeney v. Cook, 242 S.W. 2d 524 (Mo. 1951); Hubert v. Magidson,
243 S.W. 2d 337 (Mo. 1951); Arbyrd Compress Co. v. City of Arbyrd, 246 S.W. 2d
104 (Mo. App. 1952); Strafer v. Bodney, 247 S.W. 2d 630 (Mo. 1952)'; Milgram v.
Jiffy Equipment Co., 247 S.W. 2d 668 (Mo. 1952); Florida v. Wilkerson 247 S.W.
2d 678 (Mo. 1952); Handlan v. Handlan, 247 S.W. 2d 715 (Mo. 1952); Taylor v.
Baldwin, 247 S.W. 2d 741 (Mo. 1952); Jones v. Linder, 247 S.W. 2d 817 (Mo.
1952); Been v. Jolly, 247 S.W. 2d 840 (Mo. 1952); Duke v. Crossfield, 240 S.W.
2d 180 (Mo. App. 1951); Bowman v. City of East Prairie, 240 S.W. 2d 203 (Mo.
App. 1951); Dildine v. Rimpson, 240 S.W. 2d 214 (Mo. App. 1951); North Kansas
City v. Kelley, 242 S.W. 2d 582 (Mo. App. 1951); Kessler v. United Agencies, 243
S.W. 2d 779 (Mo. App. 1951); Maas v. Dreckshage, 244 S.W. 2d 397 (Mo. App.
1951); Skatoff v. Solomon, 244 S.W. 2d 590 (Mo. App. 1951).
66. Peterson v. Bledsoe, 241 S.W. 2d 375 (Mo. 1951); Taylor v. Taylor, 243
S.W. 2d 310 (Mo. 1951); Martin v. Lewis, 244 S.W. 2d 87 (Mo. 1951); Star-Times
11
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tion partly in equity and partly at law,17 to actions for divorce,"8 to a will
contest,69 and to a hearing before the state tax commission.70
This law has been held to be inapplicable where there is no conflict
in the oral testimony,71 where a case is submitted upon an agreed statement
of facts, 7  or where a case is dismissed because the cause was res adjudicata.
The reason given for the result in the last case was that de novo means anew
or again. Since the case had never been tried on the merits, the appellate
court could not have the benefit of the opinion of the trial judge upon the
credibility of the witnesses that appeared before him and could not, naturally,
consider again evidence which had never been presented.78
It has been decided that appellate courts, upon considering evidence
anew, should not reverse the trial judge's findings on the facts unless those
findings were against the clear weight of the evidence.74
It has also been held that sufficiency of evidence in a nonjury case may
be challenged on appeal though no motion for a new trial is filed.7 5 This
seems to be correct, since Section 510.310(4) of our Revised Statutes states
that the question of the sufficiency of the evidence may be raised in the
appellate court "whether or not the question was raised in the trial court."
NEw TRIALS
a. Necessity for Motion
It has been held that whether a board of public works had authority
Publishing Co. v. Buder, 245 S.W. 2d 59 (Mo. 1952); Harbin v. Schooley Station-
ary and Printing Co., 247 S.W. 2d 77 (Mo. 1952); Fisher v. Peterson, 240 S.W.
2d 176 (Mo. App. 1951); Prugh, Combest and Land, Inc. v. Linwood State Bank,
s-upra note 61; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mercantile Home Bank and Trust Co.,
241 S.W. 2d 493 (Mo. App. 1951); Conley v. Dee, 246 S.W. 2d 385 (Mo. App.
1952); Werner v. Welsh Co., 247 S.W. 2d 311 (Mo. App. 1952); Toler v. Atlanta
Life Ins. Co., 248 S.W. 2d 53 (Mo. App. 1952); Truck Leasing Corp. v. Swope, 248
S.W. 2d 84 (Mo. App. 1952); Coats v. Sandhofer, 248 S.W. 2d 455 (Mo. App. 1952).
67. VanEaton v. Dennis, 242 S.W. 2d 21 (Mo. 1951).
68. Johns v. McNabb, 247 S.W. 2d 640 (Mo. 1952); Beldt v. Beldt,,240 S.W.
2d 983 (Mo. App. 1951); Fossett v. Fossett, 243 S.W. 2d 625 (Mo. App. 1951);
Mayo v. Mayo, 244 S.W. 2d 415 (Mo. App. 1951); Brake v Brake, 244 S.W. 2d
786 (Mo. App. 1951); Phelps v. Phelps, 246 S.W. 2d 838 (Mo. App. 1952); Lasswell
v. Lasswell, 248 S.W. 2d 47 (Mo. App. 1952).
69 Capps v. Adamson, 242 S.W. 2d 556 (Mo. 1951).
70. Ulman v. Evans, 247 S.W. 2d 693 (Mo. 1952).
71. Skatoff v. Solomon, supra note 65.
72. Eiswirth Construction and Equipment Co. v. Glenn Falls Ins. Co., 240
S.W. 2d 973 (Mo. App. 1951).
73. Richter v. Frieden, 243 S.W. 2d 783 (Mo. App. 1951).
74. Bohnsack v. Hanebrink, supra note 65; Kimberly v. Presley, 245 S.W. 2d
72 (Mo. 1952); Patterson v. Wilmont, 245 S.W. 2d 116 (Mo. 1952); Harbin v.
Schooley Stationery and Printing Co., supra note 66; Pheffer v. Kleb, 241 S.W. 2d
91 (Mo. App. 1951); Werner v. Welsh Co., 247 S.W. 2d 311 (Mo. App. 1952);
Toler v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 248 S.W. 2d 53 (Mo. App. 1952); Truck Leasing
Corp. v. Swope, 248 S.W. 2d 84 (Mo. App. 1952).
75. Handlan v. Handlan, supra note 65.
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to maintain an action for or in behalf of a city to annul a contract was not
properly before the supreme court for review, where such authority was not
questioned in a motion for a new trial or in assignments of error and the
transcript did not show that the question had been presented to or considered
by the trial court.7 6
b. Growunds for
Where a summons could not be served on a juror regularly selected
because of a change of address, and the jury commissioner ascertained the
address of a person of the same name as that of the selected juror by refer-
ence to a telephone directory and the summons was served on such person
at a changed address, the fact that the person upon whom the summons
was served and who actually served was one other than the person regularly
selected, though of the same name, was not such a departure from the man-
ner of selection of jurors as prescribed by statute as would warrant the
granting of a new trial, when the juror who served was otherwise competent
and the mistake was innocent and without fraud.77
A motion for a new trial complained that the trial court erred in the
giving of "erroneous, misleading, illegal and prejudicial instructions asked
by the plaintiff, and in particular Instruction No. 1 offered on behalf of
plaintiff because said instruction is inconsistent with and diametrically op-
posed to the evidence. . . ." It was held that the general charge of error
contained in this motion for a new trial being applicable to all instructions
given on behalf of the plaintiff, though coupled with a specific assignment of
error in the giving of a specified instruction, was sufficient to justify the con-
sideration on appeal of other specifications of error in the giving of the
specified instruction.78
An award of excessive damages justifies the granting of a new trial.79 In
ruling on the question of excessiveness, the trial court must weigh all of the
evidence relating to the nature, extent, and cause of the injuries involved. 0
New trials may also be granted on the ground of newly discovered evi-
dence, though motions for new trials based on that ground are not favored.8
Newly discovered evidence to justify the granting of a new trial, must
76. Board of Public Works of Rolla v. Sho-Me Power Corp. supra note 6.
77. Sullivan v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 248 S.W. 2d 605 (Mo. 1952).
78. Duncker v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 241 S.W. 2d 64 (Mo. App. 1951).
79. Carver v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 245 S.W. 2d 96 (Mo. 1952).
80. Nix v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Ry., 240 S.W. 2d 709 (Mo. 1951).
81. Gromowsky v. Ingersol, 241 S.W. 2d 60 (Mo. App. 1951); Hayes v.
Adams, 244 S.W. 2d 123 (Mo. App. 1951).
13
Wheaton: Wheaton: New General Code
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1952
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
be material evidence and must be of such a character as would probably
produce a different result on a new trail82
Merely cumulative evidence may not be a basis for granting a new trial
on the ground that it is newly discovered. 83
Further, in order that newly discovered evidence may be a ground for
granting a new trial, the evidence must come to the knowledge of the movant
after the trial .8 Also, failure to procure the evidence before a trial ends must
not be because of lack of diligence."'
Diligence in this connection means that degree of assiduity, industry,
or careful attention called for under the circumstances of the case and does
not require impeccable, flawless investigation in all situations.8 0
Where newly discovered evidence was documentary evidence, and the
necessity of the production of it by the defendant could not have been fore-
seen by the defendant until it was too late to produce it at the trial, because
the plaintiff did not disclose the real theory of his case until near the end
of the trial, and the newly discovered evidence went to the very heart of
the controversy, the trial court should grant the defendant's motion for a
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence8 7
The fact that a juror, not appreciating the restraint imposed on him
as a juror and having no improper motive, spoke to a medical witness for
the purpose of exchanging pleasantries with the doctor was not necessarily
a ground for a new trial, where the doctor said nothing more to the juror
than he had testified to on the stand.88
c. Form of Motion
An unsigned motion for a new trial may be validity granted, since
such a motion need not be verified and the omission of the signature was a
mere matter of form.89
d. Discretion of Court
While trial courts have wide discretion in passing on motions for a new
trial where there is error in the record, and may even grant a new trial ir-
respective of the grounds assigned in a motion for a new trial, yet the power
82. Hayes v. Adams, supra note 81.
83. Ford v. Spiller, 241 S.W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1951); Hayes v. Adams, supra note
81; Jones v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 247 S.W. 2d 314 (Mo. App. 1952).
84.- Foerstel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 241 S.W. 2d 792 (Mo. App. 1951).
85. Ibid.; Hayes v. Adams, supra note 81.
86. Foerstel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 84.
87. Hayes v. Adams, supra note 81.
88. Riley v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 245 S.W. 2d 666 (Mo. App. 1952).
89. Peterson v. Bledsoe, supra note 66.
[Vol. 17
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of the trial court to grant a new trial is descretionary only as to questions
of fact and matters affecting the determination of issues of fact There is no
discretion in the law of a case, nor can there be an exercise of sound dis-
cretion as to the law of a case. 0
It is within the trial court's discretion to grant a new trial on the ground
that the verdict of the jury is against the weight of the evidence. However,
such discretion is to be judicially, not arbitrarily exercisedY'
It has recently been held that where the defendants in an action on
promissory notes made no case for the jury, the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in granting the defendants a new trial on the ground of an excessive
verdict where the judgment was merely for the alleged principal, interest,
and attorney's fees contracted for in the notes.9 2
e. Stating Reasons for Granting Motion
A trial court in granting a new trial is required by statute to specify
in the order granting the new trial the "grounds therefor," but the trial
judge is not required further to set forth in a separate memorandum his
reasons for the grounds specified or the mental process by which he deter-
mined the grounds specified in the order. So that, even though a trial judge
may have by memorandum given obscure, incorrect or erroneous reasons for
directing the entry of an order granting a new trial on the ground that the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence, nevertheless his ultimate de-
cision is conclusively presumed to have been that embodied in the required
order, and by force of it the order must be considered as in fact made on the
ground as specified -"the verdict was against the weight of the evidence."'' 3
An order requiring the plaintiff to remit a portion of a damage judgment
is construed as then grantingthe defendant a new trial on the ground that
the verdict is excessive with the privilege in the plaintiff of retaining that
portion of the judgment considered not excessive and defeating the de-
fendant's new trial.9'
A trial court's order granting a new trial on the ground that the ver-
dict was either excessive or inadequate is the equivalent of the granting of a
90. Lukitsch v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 246 S.W. 2d 749 (Mo. 1952).
See also Nix v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Ry., supra note 80 and Wicker v. Knox
Glass Associates, 242 S.W. 2d 566 (Mo. 1951). For cases applying this rule to new
trials granted because of newly discovered evidence, see Hayes v. Adams, supra note
81, and Foerstel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 84.
91. Burr v. Singh, 243 S.W. 2d 295 (Mo. 1951).
92. Latta v. Robinson Erection Co., 248 S.W. 2d 569 (Mo. 1952).
93. Burr v. Singh, supra note 91.
94. Carver v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., supra note 79.
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new trial upon the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence.9 5
According to Supreme Court Rule 1.10, if a trial court, in granting a
defendant's motion for a new trial, makes a general finding that there is
error in giving an instruction for the plaintiff, without pointing out the
ground on which he based his judgment, his ruling is presumed to be erron-
eous and the burden is on the defendant to sustain the decision of the trial
court.'
L Effect of Not Making Remittitur
When a remittitur is not made within the time required in an order
granting a new trial subject to remittitur, the motion for a new trial
stands sustained.97
g. Granting New Trial on Court's Initiative
A trial court may grant a new trial on its own initiative 8 However, it
must do so within thirty days after entry of the judgment in the case
involved.09
OBJECTIONS TO TRIAL ERRORS
As is well known, objections must be made to the trial court to errors
occurring before that court in order to preserve them for consideration by
an appellate court of this state. During the year our appellate courts have
applied this rule-to testimony both on direct examination00 and on cross-
examination,' 1° to remarks of counsel during trial, 0 2 to remarks of the trial
judge,'0 3 to a motion for a directed verdict, 10 4 to instructions, °0  to failure to
postpone a trial temporarily, 0 6 to an argument, 0 7 and to the coverage of a
judgment 08
95. Nix v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Ry., supra note 80.
96. Lillard v. Bradford, 243 S.W. 2d 359 (Mo. App. 1951).
97. Latta v. Robinson Erection Co., supra note 92; Thompson v. St. Louis
Public Service Co., 242 S.W. 2d 299 (Mo. App. 1951).
98. Ford v. Spiller, supra note 83, Ridenour v. Duncan, 246 S.W. 2d 765
(Mo. 1952); Hynes v. Risch, 243 S.W. 2d 116 (Mo. App. 1951).
99. Ridenour v. Duncan, supra note 98; Hynes v. Risch, supra note 98.
100. LeGrand v. Drive-It Co., 247 S.W. 706 (Mo. 1952); Lonnecker v. Borris,
245 S.W. 2d 53 (Mo. 1952).
101. Ibid.
102. Wilcox v. Coons, supra note 32.
103. Southall v. Columbia National Bank, 244 S.W. 2d 577 (Mo. App. 1951).
104. Vandeventer v. Shields, 241 S.W. 2d 53 (Mo. App. 1951).
105. Lonnecker v. Borris, supra note 100; Padgett v. St. Louis Public Service
Col, 240 S.W. 2d 970 (Mo. App. 1951); Whaley v. Milton Construction and Supply
Co., 241 S.W. 2d 23 (Mo. App. 1951).
106. Allison v. Mildred, 245 S.W. 2d 86 (Mo. 1952).
107. Enyart v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 241 S.W. 2d 268 (Mo.
1951); Geers v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 247 S.W. 2d 318 (Mo. App. 1952).
108. Tabor v. Ford, 240 S.W. 2d 737 (Mo. App. 1951).
[Vol. 17
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It is also clear that the general rule is that one must specify his ground
for an objection to an alleged error in a proceeding before a trial court.10 9
But one need go no further to save a ruling for an appeal thereon than to
make a clear objection to it.11°
Where a trial court sustained the defendant's objections but, in most
instances, the defendant did not request further action on the part of the
trial court, the defendant could not assert upon appeal as error failure of the
trial court to do more than was requested by the defendant."
The old Missouri law that the failure of a petition to state a cause of





It is true that the right to appeal is statutory and exists only when
statutes permit appeal, but it is equally true that appeals are favored and
satutes granting them must be liberally construed." 3
b. Aggrieved Party
Where a suit is dismissed by the plaintiff, the defendant is not "ag-
grieved" within the meaning of the statute, and is not entitled to appeal." 4
A co-defendant of one who has been given an improper instruction or
who makes an improper argument which injures the co-defendant is an
aggrieved party."15
c. Piecemeal Appeal
The general rule is that appeals may not be taken piecemeal.116 This
doctrine has recently been applied to an order dismissing a cross-claim."1T
However, Supreme Court Rule 3.29 provides that when a separate
trial of any claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim is had, a separate
109. Bennett v. Cutler, 245 S.W. 2d 900 (Mo. 1952); Louis Steinbaum Real
Estate Co. v. Maltz, 247 S.W. 652 (Mo. 1952); Clark v. Missouri National Gas
Co, 245 S.W. 2d 685 (Mo. App. 1952). See Schiwengruber v. St. Louis Public
Service Co., 241 S.W. 2d 782 (Mo. App. 1951), for too general an objection.
110. Rhees v. Koehler, 241 S.W. 2d 812 (Mo. App. 1951).
111. Higgins v. Terminal R.R. Association of St. Louis, 241 S.W. 2d 380 (Mo.
1951).
112. Casper v. Lee, supra note 10.
113. Edmondson v. Edmondson, supra note 2. Also see Wicker v. Knox Glass
Associates, supra note 90; Graham v. Bottorff, 240 S.W. 2d 191 (Mo. App. 1951);
Green v. Green, supra note 3; Marionville v. Frazier, 242 S.W. 2d 737 (Mo. App.
1951).
114. Marionville v. Frazier, supra note 113.
115. O'Donnell v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 58.
116. Green v. Green, supra note 3; Kidd v. Katz Drug Co., 244 S.W. 2d 605
(Mo. App. 1951).
117. Kidd v. Katz Drug Co., supra note 116.
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judgment which is entered will be deemed a final judgment for the pur-
pose of appeal. This had been held to apply to cross-claims, although they
are not specifically referred to in the rule.118
d. Defense Waived
The usual rule is that defenses not presented in motions or in pleadings
are waived for the purpose of appeal. This maxim was applied in a broker's
action against prospective purchasers for commission for services in con-
nection with an attemped sale of realty. As the purchasers did not set up
the defense of dual employment in their answer, they could not assert for
the first time in the court of appeals the defense that the contract sued
upon was void as against public policy."0
e. Final Judgments
Appeals may be taken from final judgments120
A final judgment must dispose of all issues in the case.121
During the year it was decided that an order setting aside a default
judgment was appealable as a final judgment.122
On the other hand, is was decided that, where one claim was asserted
against two defendants jointly in a personal injury action, an order of
the trial court sustaining the motion of one defendant for a new trial pre-
vented the entry of a final appealable judgment in the case, and that an
appeal by the plaintiff from a denial of his motion for a new trial after a
verdict in favor of the other defendant would be premature.12
Also, where a suit was dismissed as to one defendant but no disposition
was made as to the other defendants, it was held that the judgment was
not final, even though the other defendants had not been served, and an
appeal from the order of dismissal was premature. 24
Further, where the custody of an infant child of parties to a divorce
action was sought by the plaintiff in a complaint and by the defendant in
a cross-bill, and the trial court made an entry awarding the custody of the
child to the defendant temporarily only, such entry was said not to be an
118. Ibid.
119. Shepley v. Green, 243 S.W. 2d 772 (Mo. App. 1951).
120. Green v. Green, supra note 3.
121. Graham v. Bottorff, 240 S.W. 2d 191 (Mo. App. 1951); Green v. Green,
supra note 3, Allcorn v. Allcorn, 241 S.W. 2d 806 (Mo. App. 1951); Kidd v. Katz
Drug Co., supra note 116.
122. Casper v. Lee, supra note 10.
123. Wicker v. Knox Glass Associates, supra note 90.
124. Downey v. United Weatherproofing, Inc., supra note 4.
[Vol. 17
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appealable "final judgment," as it did not make a final award of the child's
custody.120
Likewise, a court of appeals has decreed that an order overruling a
motion to dismiss a petition was not a final judgment. The court believed
that the order did not finally settle anything since the defendant could
refuse to plead further and could permit judgment to go against him, or he
could plead to the petition and try the case on the merits? 26
f. Order Relating to Recewers
In addition to permitting appeals from final judgments, Section 512.020
of our Revised Statutes allows an appeal from an order of a trial court
in a receivership suit denying a motion to revoke an order appointing a
receiver1 27
g. Special Orders
It also allows an appeal from "any special order after a final judgment."
This provision refers to orders in special proceedings attacking or aiding
the enforcement of a judgment. It includes an order refusing a motion to
stay, or to forbid the issuance of, an execution, a judgment having been
rendered for the plaintiff.128
h. Miscellaneous Orders
An order overruling a motion to strike out the reinstatement of a case
which at one time had been dismissed for want of prosecution was held not
to be appealable, since it did not fall within any category of appealable
orders provided for in Section 512.020.22
The same conclusion was reached in connection with an order quash-
ing or dissolving an attachment where the cause had not been tried on the
merits.21 0
i. How Taken
1. Notice of Appeal
(a) Necessity for
The vital step for perfecting an appeal is the timely filing of a notice
of appeal.1 1
125. Green v. Green, supra note 3.
126. Graham v. Bottorff, sufira note 121.
127. Harbin v. Schooley Stationery and Printing Co., supra note 66.
128. City of Caruthersville, v. Cantrell, 241 S.W. 2d 790 (Mo. App. 1951).
129. Mitchell v. Johnston, 241 S.W. 2d 902 (Mo. 1951).
130. Scheele v. Long, 244 S.W. 2d 395 (Mo. App. 1951).
131. Hynes v. Risch, supra note 98.
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(b) Time for Filing
Since the right of appeal is statutory, a notice of appeal must be filed
within the time prescribed by statute or an appellate court will be without
jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a case.132
When a motion for a new trial is filed, the judgment does not become
final until the motion is disposed of either by the passing of ninety days
when it is deemed denied under Section 510.360 of our Revised Statutes or
by action of the court upon the motion prior to the expiration of the ninety
day period. The above section and Section 510.340, as clarified by Supreme
Court Rule 3.24, have been construed to mean that when the thirty days
after the entry of judgment have passed and the motion for a new trial
has been ruled upon, the judgment is then final, and the trial court is
without further power to disturb it.13
Thus where judgment was entered on March 30 and, within the proper
time, a motion for a new trial was filed, and that motion was overruled on
May 1, 32 days after the entry of judgment, the judgment became final on
the overruling of the motion, and notice of appeal on May 23 was without
effect because it was not made within 10 days after the judgment became
final, notwithstanding that orders of the trial court after May 1 attempted
to set aside the order of May 1, since such orders were void.134
On the other hand, where judgment for the plaintiff in a personal in-
jury action was entered on April 26, 1950, and on July 3, 1950, the trial
court entered an order requiring remittitur within ten days as a condition
of an overruling of a motion for a new trial, the order became appealable
upon the expiration of the ten-day period granted the plaintiff to make
his choice as to remittitur, and the plaintiff's appeal on July 22, 1950, within
ten days after the expiration of the ten-day period for remittitur, was a
timely and proper appeal from the order of the court sustaining the defen-
dant's motion for a new trial. 1
3
(c) Place of Filing
The fact that by mistake a notice of appeal reciting that the plaintiff
appealed to the proper court of appeals was filed in the supreme court does
not invalidate the appeal to the court of appeals. The notice and any other





135. Wicker v. Knox Glass Associates, supra note 90.
136. Skatoff v. Solomon, supra note 65.
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2. Request for Special Order Allowing Appeal
Similarly, it was held that in the absence of intentional fraud upon
the court or parties and when no want of jurisdiction is apparent in the
application for a special order allowing an appeal, the order made there-
under granting the same is not invalidated by the fact that when the appeal
is later perfected the appellate court determines its lack of jurisdiction of
the appeal. The appeal is merely transferred to the proper court.'8 7
3. Transcript
(a) Verification of
Section 512.110 of our Revised Statutes provides only two methods of
verification of the transcript of the record on appeal. If the parties agree
that the transcript "correctly includes all of the record, proceedings and
evidence," a complete transcript need not be approved by the trial court.
But the trial court must approve an abbreviated transcript or a complete
transcript upon failure of the parties to agree that it is a complete transcript.
The "correctness" of any alleged complete transcript is involved either
where the adverse party expressly refuses to agree, or where the parties
fail within a reasonable time to agree, that the transcript is a complete one.
In either instance, there is a "dispute concerning the correctness" which
the trial court must resolve. Where the respondents in their motion allege,
and the appellant in his reply admits, that the respondents' counsel refused
to agree to a transcript because it was not "complete and correct" in that
it did not include all of the evidence, and it was also conceded that the
trial judge refused to approve the transcript when it was submitted to him,
the correctness of the transcript was involved and the transcript was incom-
plete without the approval of the court. 88
(b) Extension of Time
Time for filing a transcript may be extended even after the original
period provided for its filing has expired.189
(c) Necessity for Inclusions in
Failure to include in a transcript any reference to evidence objected
to excuses an appellate court from noticing that evidence. 40
(d) Supplemental Transcript
Supreme Court Rule 1.04 authorizes, but does not require, a respondent
dissatisfied with an appellant's transcript to file "such additional part of
137. Edmondson v. Edmondson, supra note 2.
138. Brand v. Brand, suspra note 48.
139. Fiorella v. Fiorella, 240 S.W. 2d 147 (Mo. App. 1951).
140. Wilcox v. Coons, sunpra note 32.
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the record as he deems necessary." This does not deprive a respondent of
the right to move for the dismissal of an appellant's incorrect or defective
transcript. Nor is there a duty upon the appellate court to complete an




(a) Abandonment of Grounds for Appeal
Where a plaintiff gave notice of an appeal but filed no brief in the
supreme court as an appellant, the supreme court would treat the appeal
as having been abandoned.142
If a question is timely raised in the trial court but is not briefed, an
appellate court will deem such a question abandoned. 143
(b) Jurisdictional Statement
The appellant's brief, stating that since the amount involved was
$35,000, the supreme court had jurisdiction did not violate Supreme Court
Rule 1.08 requiring a statement demonstrating that court's jurisdiction. 14'
(c) Statement of Facts
To comply with the court rule 1.08 with respect to briefs a statement
of facts should tell the appellate court what the law suit is about and
should be in narrative form.1
45
Usually, a statement which omits essential facts on which an appellant's
adversary relies is insufficient. However, when both parties appeal and
their combined briefs contain the facts on which they both rely, the fact that
the brief of one of them does not contain the facts on which the other
relies will not result in a: dismissal of either appeal.1 46
Though the court rules require a fair and concise statement of facts
without argument, fairness of the statement is not to be sacrificed for
conciseness.1 47
(d) Points and Authorities
The supreme court rule that the appellant's brief shall contain points
relied on, specifying allegations of error, with citations of authorities there-
141. Brand v. Brand, supra note 48.
142. Pemberton v. Ladue Realty and Construction Co., 244 S.W. 2d 62 (Mo.
1951).
143. Merrick v. Bridgeways, Inc., supra note 17; Stribling v. Jolley, 245 S.W.
2d 885 (Mo. 1952); Reliable Life Ins. Co. v. Bell, 246 S.W. 2d 371 (Mo. App. 1952).
Compare Warinner v. Nugent, 240 S.W. 2d 941 (Mo. 1951).
144. Wood v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 246 S.W. 2d 807 (Mo. 1952).
145. Page v. Laclede Gas Co., 245 S.W. 2d 23 (Mo. 1952).
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under, contemplates particularization in the statement of such points and
citations of authorities to specific points to which they apply.148
Therefore, where the appellant's brief contains no assignments of error
except certain abstract propositions of law, without in any way showing
their applicability to the case at bar, the brief is devoid of any statement
of the points relied on and does not specify the allegations of error as
required by our rule 1.08.149
Thus, the abstract statement "Claimant entitled to expenses for cost
of operation and hospital bills," does not constitute a compliance with
Rule 1.08 governing briefs.1 50
Again, where the defendant's points and authorities attacked the plain-
tiff's verdict, asserting that an instruction (1) failed to submit the eviden-
tiary facts relied on to show negligence, (2) assumed negligence, (3) auth-
orized a finding of negligence not pleaded, (4) permitted the jury to specu-
late and was confusing, (5) was indefinite and uncertain and failed to
define important words and submit the true issues, (6) omitted essential
facts and submitted a mere conclusion of law, (7) gave the jury a roving
commission to find negligence, and (8) ignored conflicting issues of fact
and failed to instruct on issues raised by them, if they did not inform the
appellate court wherein the instruction was defective in any of the eight
allegations of error. They failed, therefore, to present the instruction for
the consideration of the upper court.151
However, it has been decided that, though the assignments of errors in
an equity case, which the appellate court is required to try anew on the
record, consisted merely of abstract statements of law, the appeal would not
be dismissed, where there was but a single obvious question in the case.15 2
An assignment of error in overruling the defendant's motion for a di-
rected verdict, which referred to and discussed only the evidence offered by
the plaintiff and made no reference to the defendant's testimony in defense
of the action, was erroneous, because all of the evidence supporting the
plaintiff's theory of the case must be considered in determining whether
148. State ex rel. Houser v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 248 S.W. 2d 592 (Mo.
1952).
149. Clark v. Empire Trust Co., 248 S.W. 2d 603 (Mo. 1952).
150. Brammer v. Brinkley Mining Co. of Missouri, 244 S.W. 2d 584 (Mo. App.
1951).
151. Carver v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. sutra note 79. Also, see Hillhouse
v. Thompson, supra note 53.
152. Milanko v. Austin, 241 S.W. 2d 881 (Mo. 1951).
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the trial court erred in overruling the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict made at the close of all the evidence.?s
(e) Argument
Where the appellant failed to point out, by specific page references to
the transcript, the rulings by which the trial court was alleged to have
erroneously excluded evidence, it was held not to be the duty of the appel-
late court to search the record in order, if possible, to discover such errors.114
Assignments of error which are not argued are waived and will not be
considered by an appellate court.1 5
(f) Reply Brief
Issues submitted in an appellants brief on the original submission are
not to be enlarged by presentations in a reply brief, as a respondent is en-
titled to an opportunity to answer an issue presented by an appellant.""
j. Burden of Proof
Where the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial
on the grounds of erroneous instructions, without specifying which of the
two instructions submitted by the plaintiff and given by the court was
erroneous, the movant had the burden on appeal to point to the erroneous
instruction and to the error which it is purported to contain.257
k. Changing Theories on Appeal
It is said to be elementary law that a case must be heard in the appel-
late court upon the same theory as that upon which it was tried in the
lower court. "
I. Matters Considered on Appeal
In absence of an appeal by the defendant and in view of a request in
the defendant's brief for an affirmance of the trial court's judgment, the
appellate court would not, on appeal by the plaintiff from an allegedly in-
adequate judgment in a personal injury action, pass on the question of
153. Altenderfer v. Harkins, 243 S.W. 2d 558 (Mo. App. 1951).
154. Southall v. Columbia National Bank, 244 S.W. 2d 577 (Mo. App. 1951).
For another case requing page references to the transcript, see LeGrand v. U-
Drive-It Co., supra note 100.
155. Hillhouse v. Thompson, supra note 53.
156. State ex tel. Houser v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., supra note 148.
157. Newman v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,. 244 S.W. 2d 45 (Mo. 1951).
158. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mercantile Home Bank and Trust Co., 241
S.W. 2d 493 (Mo. App. 1951); Spiking School Dist. No. 71, DeKalb County v.
Purported "Enlarged School District R-11, DeKalb County, Missouri," supra note
21; Spears v. Schantz, 246 S.W. 2d 399 (Mo. App. 1952).
(Vol. 17
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whether the plaintiff's evidence showed him to be guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.15
Again, where the original petition was not brought up in the transcript,
and there was nothing to show such a petition raised a constitutional ques-
tion, the supreme court could not determine whether such a question was
raised by the original petition. 160
It has further been held generally that, where the appealing party filed
no after-trial motions, the appellate court was precluded from reviewing an
error occurring in the trial of the case other than whether a submissible case
was made.'""
Although plain errors may be considered even though they are not
effectively raised on the appeal,162 for them to be noticed by the appellate
court they must have resulted in manifest injustice or in a miscarriage
of justice"13
On the other hand the supreme court is loath not to rule the case on
appeal on the merits.0 4
The appellate court will decide whether an order appealed from is
appealable, since that question relates to the court's jurisdiction over the
cause. 65
m. When Appellate Court Obtains Jurisdiction
After the notice of appeal and the transcript in a case are filed with
the appellate court, that court has exclusive jurisdiction of a motion to re-
mand the cause for a new trial because of newly-discovered evidence.',"
n. Duty of Appellate Courts
1. In General
An appellate court must render such a decree as it thinks should have
been rendered in the trial court.167
159. Davis v. City of Mountain View, 247 S.W. 2d 539 (Mo. App. 1952).
160. Swisher Investment Co. v. Brimson Drainage Co., 245 S.W. 2d 75 (Mo.
1952).
161. Lilly v. Boswell, 242 S.W. 2d 73 (Mo. 1951). For further applications of
this doctrine, see Blase v. Austin, 242 S.W. 2d 29 (Mo. 1951); Taylor v. Baldwin,
247 S.W. 2d 741 (Mo. 1952); Wilson v. Kansas City, 248 S.W. 2d 671 (Mo. App.
1952).
162. Pettus v. City of St. Louis, 242 S.W. 2d 723 (Mo. 1951). Also see Johnson
v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 214 S.W. 2d 5 (Mo. 1948).
163. Geers v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 107; Louis Steinbaum
Real Estate Co. v. Maltz, supra note 109.
164. Carver v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., supra note 79.
165. Graham v. Bottorff, supra note 113; Green v. Green, supra note 3; City
of Caruthersville v. Cantrell, supra note 128.
166. Curry v. Thompson, 247 S.W. 2d 792 (Mo. 1952).
167. Duke v. Crossfield, 240 S.W. 2d 180 (Mo. App. 1951).
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2. In Connection with Pleadings
In passing upon the sufficiency of a petition an appellate court must
indulge every reasonable intendment in favor of the petition."' It may also
take into consideration the ultimate facts which may be inferred from the
facts well pleaded, as well as all inferences which logically flow from such
pleaded facts.169
It should also consider the petition as a whole with all of its several
allegations giving such construction thereto as will do substantial justice.'10
3. As to Matters Involving Discretion of Court or Jury
Appellate courts will not reverse decisions of trial courts on matters
within the discretion thereof unless the trial courts abuse such discretion.
During the year, this doctrine has been applied to rulings relating to a
motion for permission to examine a party physically,"'1 to the admissibility
of evidence,172 to instructions,"73 to arguments, 17 4 to the modifying of a
decree dealing with the custody of children, 75 and to an appeal on the
ground of the insufficiency of the evidence.176
4. Weighing Evidence
On appeal from a judgment rendered on a verdict of a jury, an appel-
late court is not authorized to weigh the evidenceU7"
In particular, it has been said that where, under the law and the evi-
dence, the matter simply comes down to a question of the credibility of
witnesses, the reviewing court will defer to the trial judge who heard and
saw them. 73
168. Hammond v. City of El Dorado Springs, 242 S.W. 2d 479 (Mo. 1951);
Boyer v. Guidicy Marble, Terazzo and Tile Co., supra note 30.
169. Hammond v. City of El Dorado Springs, supra note 168.
170. Rhodei v. Rhodes' Estate, 246 S.W. 2d 98 (Mo. 1952).
171. Enyart v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., supra note 107.
172. Merrick v. Bridgeways, Inc., supra note 17; Blackburn v. Gaydon, 245
S.W. 2d 161 (Mo. App. 1951); Jones v. Terminal R.R. Association of St. Louis,
246 S.W. 2d 356 (Mo. App. 1952).
173. Roush v. Alkire Truck Lines, 245 S.W. 2d 8 (Mo. 1952).
174. Venditti v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 240 S.W. 2d 921 (Mo 1951);
Polizzi v. Nedrow, 247 S.W. 2d 809 (Mo. 1952); Riley v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., supra note 88.
175. Fordyce v. Fordyce, 242 S.W. 2d 307 (Mo. App. 1951).
176. Burr v. Singh, supra note 91; Roush v. Alkire Truck Lines, supra note 173.
177. Nix v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Ry., supra note 80; Wilcox v. Coons, .rupra
note 32; O'Donnell v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 246 S.W. 2d 539 (Mo. App.
1951).
178. Wood v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 241 S.W. 2d 802 (Mo. App.
1951).
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o. Tests Applied in Reaching Judgment as to
Whether Submissible Case Has Been Made
1. Substantial Evidence
In those cases in which the question is as to whether or not a submis-
sible case has been presented, an appellate court will not disturb a decision
in the trial court, if it concludes that the finding is based upon substantial
evidence.179 Some courts have stated that they would not disturb a decision
rendered in a trial court, if there was any evidence supporting the holding
in that court 80
A somewhat unusual application of this rule is found in the decision
that it would be improper to review a trial error in the submission of one
element of negligence when a submissible case was made upon other ele-
ments thereof that were pleaded.181
The general rule has been stated to the effect that only when there
is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached
in the trial court does a reversible error appear. Where there is an eviden-
tiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve
whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. The appellate court's
function is exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it
being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel
that another conclusion is more reasonable.182
2. Evidence Considered
It has been held recently that, in determining whether the plaintiff
has made a submissible case, the evidence in the defendant's favor should
be disregarded and only that evidence favorable to the plaintiff, together
with all reasonable inferences therefrom, should be considered, and that
the plaintiff is entitled to the aid of any evidence offered by the defendant
which is favorable to the plaintiff and not in conflict with the fundamental
theory of his case. 1 3
179. Peterson v. Bledsoe, supra note 66; Higgins v. Terminal R.R. Association
of St. Louis, 241 S.W. 2d 380 (Mo. 1951); Dowdell v. Hasset, 247 S.W. 2d 691 (Mo.
1952); Hillhouse v. Thompson, supra note 53; Clark v. City of Springfield, 241 S.
W. 2d 100 (Mo. App. 1951); Rosenblum v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 242 S.W. 2d
304 (Mo. App. 1951); E.F. Drew and Co. v. Brooks Supply Co., 243 S.W. 2d
621 (Mo. App. 1951); Delcour v. Wilson, 245 S.W. 2d 467 (Mo. App. 1952).
180. Thompson v. Thompson, 240 S.W. 2d 137 (Mo. 1951); Sprankle v.
Thompson, 243 S.W. 2d 510 (Mo. 1951); Union Service Co. v. Lyons, 240 S.W. 2d
153 (Mo. App. 1951).
181. Lilly v. Boswell, supra note 161.
182. Spears v. Schantz, supra note 158.
183. See v. Wabash R.R., 242 S.W. 2d 15 (Mo. 1951). The following cases
support one or more of the points decided in the See case: Stokes v. Carlson, 240
S.W. 2d 132 (Mo. 1951); Banta v. Union Pacific R.R., 242 S.W. 2d 34 (Mo. 1951);
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Some courts have stated more specifically and correctly that all evi-
dence favorable to the plaintiff must be taken to be true.18'
The doctrines referred to above have been applied in cases of appeals
where a motion for a directed verdict has been overruled,85 and where a
motion for a judgment pursuant to a motion for a directed verdict has
been refused21B
p. Appeals on Ground of Excessive or Iiadequate Verdicts
or Judgments
1. Reluctance of Court to Interfere
It has been well said that, in determining whether a verdict is excessive,
there is a vital distinction, which an appellate court is prompt to recog-
nize, between its own position and that of the trial court. The distinction
is, of course, that the appellate court can only review the amount of the
verdict as a question of law presented on the cold record, while the trial
court has both the plaintiff and the other witnesses before it, and is not
only entitled to weigh the evidence, but can actually see for itself and draw
its own conclusions as to what the extent of an injury appears to be. Because
of the advantage which the trial court's position gives it in this respect,
an appellate court in any event accords great weight to whatever is re-
vealed regarding the trial court's viewpoint of the compensation to be
awarded; and where, by ordering remittitur, it has directly passed upon
the question of the excessiveness of the verdict, the appellate court, while
in no sense bound by its decision, is always most reluctant to interfere.1ir
Malone v. Gardner, 242 S.W. 2d 516 (Mo. 1951); Cloughly v. Equity Mutual Ins.
Co., 243 S.W. 2d 961 (Mo. 1951); Utlaut v. Glick Real Estate Co., 246 S.W. 2d
760 (Mo. 1952); Wright v. Stevens, 246 S.W. 2d 817 (Mo. 1952); LeGrand v.
U-Drive-It Co., supra note 100; Brown v. Moore, supra note 60; Joplin v. Franz,
240 S.W. 2d 209 (Mo. App. 1951); Hillhouse v. Thompson, supra note 53; Clark
v. City of Springfield, supra note 179; Maisch v. Kansas City Stock Yards Company
of Maine, 241 S.W. 2d 487 (Mo. App. 1951); Schwinegruber v. St. Louis Public
Service Co., supra note 109; Rosenblum v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 242
S.W. 2d 304 (Mo. App. 1951); Rayburn v. Fricke, 243 S. W. 2d 768 (Mo. App.
1951); Roux v. Silver King Oil and Gas Co., 244 S.W. 2d 411 (Mo. App. 1951);
Davenport v. Midland Bldg. Co., 245 S.W. 2d 460 (Mo. App. 1952); Riley v.
St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 88; Cline v. City of St. Joseph, 245
S.W. 2d 695 (Mo. App. 1952); Meriwether v. Lumbard, 246 S.W. 2d 363 (Mo.
App. 1952); Spicer v. Hannah, supra note 25; In re Gaebler's Estate, 248 S.W.
2d 12 (Mo. App. 1952).
184. Joplin v. Franz, supra note 183; Hillhouse v. Thompson, supra note 53;
Clark v. City of Springfield, supra note 182; Meriwether v. Lumbard, supra
note 182.
185. Kidd v. Thompson, supra note 116.
186. McClanahan v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 242 S.W. 2d 265 (Mo. App.
1951).
187. Riley v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 88.
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2. Excessiveness or Inadequacy Must Be Shocking
The question of the amount of damages is primarily for the jury. The
jury's broad discretion in fixing the amount of the award is conclusive on
appeal, especially where the verdict has the approval of the trial court,
unless the appellate court can say that the verdict is so shocking and
grossly excessive or inadequate as to indicate that the amount of the ver-
dict is due to passion and prejudice; and that the broad discretion granted to
the jury and to the trial court in weighing the evidence has been arbitrarily
exercised and abused.188
The mere fact that a verdict is excessive does not in and of itself estab-
lish that it was the result of passion and prejudice. 89
3. Substantial Evidence
Although an appellate court will not weigh the evidence relating to a
plaintiff's disabilities on appeal from an order granting a new trial on the
ground that a verdict was excessive, it will examine the record to determine
whether there was substantial evidence to sustain the trial courtes view that
such disabilities were not as serious or as permanent as claimed or that
some of the disabilities did not result from the accident involved in the
plaintiff's action.1'1
4. Evidences Considered
The same types of evidence are, in general, considered on appeal in
determining whether or not a verdict or judgment is excessive or inadequate
as are looked to in deciding whether or not a submissible case has been
made.1 9 '
The supreme court has said that, in deciding whether or not a verdict
is excessive, it could only consider evidence that was before the jury. 92
However, it suggested that it might order a new trial, if after-trial facts
188. Brown v. Moore, supra note 60. In accord, Polizzi v. Nedrow, supra note
174; Padgett v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 240 S. W. 2d 970 (Mo. App. 1951);
Gromowsky v. Ingersol, supra note 81; Thompson v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., supra note 97; Schraedel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 248 S.W. 2d 25
(Mo. App. 1952). For a case of shocking inadequacy, see Davis v. City of
Mountain View, supra note 159.
189. Carver v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., supra note 79.
190. Nix v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Ry., supra note 80.
191. Enyart v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., supra note 107; Wicker v.
Knox Glass Associates, supra note 90; Harrington v. Thompson, 243 S.W. 2d
519 (Mo. 1951); Polizzi v. Nedrow, supra note 174; Brown v. Moore, supra note
60; Arl v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 243 S.W. 2d 797 (Mo. App. 1951);
Jones v. Terminal R.R. Association of St. Louis, 246 S.W. 2d 356 (Mo. App.
1952). Also see cases in notes 183 through 186.
192. Curry v. Thompson, 247 S.W. 2d 792 (Mo. 1952).
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were of such a decisive character as to render reasonably certain a different
result on a retrial than that obtained at the original hearing.193
5. Regard for Trial Court's Attitude
The fact that a trial court has refused to set aside a verdict as excessive
has been held to be significant by the St. Louis County Court of Appeals,
when the problem of acting on an appeal from a judgment on a verdict
which was claimed to be excessive was before it.194
6. Evidence Contrary to Facts
In determining whether or not a verdict is excessive, an appellate court
is not required to consider evidence contrary to known physical facts.,
7. Reducing Judgment
An appellate court is usually reluctant to order a further reduction of
a verdict after the trial court has considered and passed upon the matter
and has once substantially reduced the amount thereof. This is because of
the trial judge's advantage of having seen and heard the parties and the
witnesses as they appeared before him, giving him a better opportunity to
evaluate their testimony than the upper court has.' 6
q. Trial Court's Decision Preswed Correct
On appeal, the presumption is that the trial court's decision was cor-
rect, and the burden is on the appellant affirmatively to show error as a
condition precedent to reversal.197
For example, in an equity case to establish a wife's ownership of prop-
erty upon the theory of a resulting trust, where the appellant did not in
his transcript set out deeds nor file originals in the supreme court, the su-
preme court assumed that the relevant deeds properly described the property
and that the trial court properly incorporated the description from the deeds
into the decree.1 8
Further, the appellate court presumed that, in the final determination
of the trial court, it considered only competent and relevant evidence.100
r. Two Motions for Directed Verdict
Where a defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the
plaintiff's case, but did not stand on that motion and offered testimony in
193. Ibid.
194. Schwinegruber v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 109.
195. Enyart v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., supra note 107.
196. Pettus v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 162.
197. James v. James, 248 S.W. 2d 623 (Mo. 1952); Johnson v. Johnson, 240
S.W. 2d 184 (Mo. App. 1951).
198. James v. James, supra note 197.
199. Johnson v. Johnson, supra note 197.
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defense of the action, and, at the close of the evidence, re-offered a motion
for a directed verdict, which was overruled, the reviewing court could only
consider whether the trial court erred in overruling the last motion.200
s. Judgment of Ap-pellate Court
1. Dismissal for Noncompliance with Rules of Court
There may, under Rule 1.15 of the supreme court, be a dismissal of an
appeal for failure to comply with its Rule 1.08 relating to the statement of
the facts in a brief.
There was a dismissal ordered where the appellant's statement did not
purport to tell the facts of the case and was not a statement of the facts
in any form but was a recitation of the proceedings.201
On the other hand, an appeal was not dismissed, though the appellant's
statement of facts was insufficient, where the respondent made his own
statement which offended as much as had the appellant's. 202 The same action
was taken though the statements of fact were insufficient, where there was
but a single issue to be considered,2O3 and where the appellate court be-
lieved that justice required that the case be decided upon the merits since
it presented the problem of the construction of the "vigilant watch ordinance"
of the city of St. Louis. 2 4
Again, it has been decided that, having ruled on the issues of an appeal
on its merits, it was not necessary to consider the respondent's motion to
dismiss the appeal as an alleged attempt to appeal from an order of the
court overruling a motion for a new trial, and for alleged violation of Su-
preme Court Rules 1.08 and 1.09.205
2. Judgment Affirmed or Reversed
Where there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of liability
and there was no indication that other evidence was available, the review-
ing court did not consider the contentions relating to the amendment of
the petition, but affirmed the judgment on a directed verdict for the defen-
dant.2 00
200. Altenderfer v. Harkins, 243 S.W. 2d 558 (Mo. App. 1951).
201. Page v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 245 S.W. 2d 23 (Mo. 1951).
202. See v. Wabash R.R., supra note 183.
203. Peterson v. Bledsoe, supra note 66.
204. Abernathy v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 25. Also see the
case in note 79.
205. Coleman v. Ziegler, 248 S.W. 2d 610 (Mo. 1952).
206. Oliver v. Oakland Country Club, 245 S.W. 2d 37 (Mo. 1951).
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Although an order setting aside a default judgment on the ground
of irregularities could not be sustained on the ground specified of record by
the trial court, it was held that the defendant was entitled to have other
assignments of error in the motion reviewed and to have the order affirmed
if it could be sustained on such other grounds. 207
Where the appellate court on a first- appeal held that the evidence of the
defendant's negligence was sufficient to make a case for the jury, and the evi-
dence at the second trial was not substantially different, and the former rul-
ing on appeal was not palpably wrong, the court on a subsequent appeal
refused to depart from its conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to
take the case to the jury and, therefore, affirmed the judgment below.208
Ordinarily, withdrawal and exclusion of erroneously admitted evidence
leaves no ground for reversing a judgment on account of such admission.20 D
An appellate court is precluded from reversing a judgment unless it
believes that an error was committed against the appellant which materially
affected the merits of the action.211
This rule has been applied to the admission, and to the lack, of evi-
dence,211 to an offer of proof,2' 2 to the refusal of a requested instruc-
tion,213 to a stricken argument,214 to the recognition of one of two verdicts
after the discharge of the jury,2 5 and to the overruling of a motion for a
new trial. 216
Reversal was ordered in an action by an employee against his employer
for personal injuries sustained in the operation of a tractor, where his wife's
testimony was offered solely to show that the defendant was guilty of negli-
gence in not furnishing safe machinery. Her testimony that the employer
offered to see his employee through the summer and to take care of hospital
bills was thought to be so highly prejudicial that the withdrawal of the
testimony from the jury was insufficient to correct the error of its ad-
mission.217
207. Casper v. Lee, supra note 10.
208. Lonnecker v. Borris, supra note 100.
209. Spears v. Schantz, supra note 158.
210. Schraedel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 248 S.W. 2d 25 (Mo. App.
1952).
211. Kunz v. Munzlinger, 242 S.W. 2d 536 (Mo. 1951); LeGrand v. U-Drive-
It Co., s-tpra note 100; Fisher v. Peterson, 240 S.W. 2d 176 (Mo. App. 1951).
212. Bohnsack v. Hanebrink, supra note 65.
213. Wilcox v. Coons, supra note 32; Whaley v. Milton Construction and
Supply Co., supra note 57; Brewer v. Gowin, 241 S.W. 2d 275 (Mo. App. 1951).
214. Pettus v. St. Louis Public Service Co., s-pra note 162.
215. Riley v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 88.
216. Roush v. Alkire, supra note 173.
217. Spears v. Schantz, s-upra note 158.
[Vol. 17
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Also it was decided that an improper argument of counsel for a motor-
ist in a personal injury action against another motorist and a bus company
with respect to the whereabouts of bus passengers, whose names the bus
driver took at the scene of the accident, and the drawing of an inference
unfavorable to the bus company because of the non-production of those
passengers as witnesses, was not cured by an instruction to the jury that
there was no imputation to be cast against any party for nonproduction of
witnesses and that the names and addresses of all witnesses that were in
the files of the court were available to all of the parties. The judgment for
the plaintiff against the bus company was reversed, as the court had refused
to strike the offensive argument, and had not instructed the jury to disregard
it.*218
3. Cause Remanded
Where a cause of action for wrongful discharge was remanded for
another trial because of a prejudicially erroneous admission of evidence,
the appellate court did not determine whether the instructions given were
prejudicially erroneous or whether the verdict was excessive.219
When necessary, a new trial may be granted upon a reversal.
Sometimes the new trial is ordered to be of the entire case, as in
instances in which the appellate court is not satisfied with the disposition
of any part of the issues involved and it believes that evidence will be avail-
able properly to decide the case.22
0
At other times, the mandate is that the new trial shall be only of part
of the issues involved in the case.
Thus, where it neither appeared nor was argued on appeal that the
plaintiff's right of recovery was limited to a judgment against the defendants
jointly, it was held that the granting of a new trial to one of the defendants
did not necessitate the granting of a new trial to the other defendant.221
Where the only error of the trial court relates to damages, the new
trial ordered may be confined to that issue.
222
218. O'Donnell v. St. Louis Public Service Co., suspra note 58.
219. Wilson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 247 S.W. 2d 644 (Mo. 1952).
220. Nix v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Ry., supra note 80; In re City of Kinloch,
242 S.W. 2d 59 (Mo. 1951); Foerstel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., swpra note
85; Davis v. City of Mountain View, supra note 159.
221. Nix v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Ry., supra note 80.
222. Lilly v. Boswell, supra note 161; Thompson v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., supra note 97.
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4. Penalty for Vexatious Appeal
Where the supreme court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff and
ordered the trial court to restore the defendant to all things lost by reason
of the judgment and thereafter on a second appeal reversed the order denying
restitution and ordered the trial court to grant restitution and a third appeal
was taken from an order granting restitution on the ground that trial court
had discretion to deny restitution, the supreme court awarded damages in
the amount of 5 % of the judgment under the statute permitting a penalty
in case of a vexatious appeal.223
t. Reheaing
Where there were two separate actions relating to the same premises
which dealt with different causes of action, the appellate court held that it
would not be justified in deferring the disposition of a motion for a re-
hearing on the appeal in one cause until the final determination of the appeal
in the other action.224
u. Transfer
Where a question of general interest and importance was involved in a
cause appealed to a court of appeals, on reversing the judgment, it trans-
ferred the case to the supreme court.225
Where the supreme court had never specifically overruled a certain line
of cases with the result that uncertainty in the law existed the court of
appeals transferred the cause to the supreme court for re-examination of
the law.226
Where a court of appeals, after affirming a judgment for the plaintiff
in an action for injuries sustained in an automobile collision, transferred the
cause to the supreme court because of general interest or importance of a
question involved, the supreme court could finally determine the cause as if
it had come to it on an original appeal.227
223. De Mayo v. Lyons, 243 S.W. 2d 967 (Mo. 1951).
224. Thomsen v. Mill, 248 S.W. 2d 6 (Mo. App. 1952).
225. Beetschen v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 248 S.W. 2d 66 (Mo. App. 1952).
226. McClanahan v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 186.
227. Young v. Anthony, 248 S. W. 2d 864 (Mo. 1952).
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